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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did a delay of five months between artest and trial, caused by
the prosecution, violate appellant Miller's right to a speedy
trial?
i

2.

Did the Trial Court violate Appellant|Miller's right against
double jeopardy by reversing its order to dismiss the aggravated
assault charge?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
-vCajse No. 860335

LEONARD G. MILLER
Defendant/Appellant

Category No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE fcASE
The Appellant, Leonard G. Miller}, appeals from judgment and
convictions of retail theft while armed with a deadly weapon, a
second degree felony, aggravated assault,! a third degree felony and
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third
degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge,
presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 9, 1985, the appellant, Mr. Leonard Miller, was
involved in a fight with one Ralph Robinson.

Mr. Miller was issued

a citation for simple assault and ordered to appear in Fifth Circuit
Court, West Valley Division, to answer changes on November 18,
1985.

Mr. Miller failed to appear.

A b^nch warrant was issued for

his arrest.
On December 4, 1985, Leonard Miller allegedly walked into e
Food-4-Less grocery store in West Valley City, picked up a case of
beer and a carton of cigarettes, and walked out the door without

paying for them. (R. 81). The assistant manager, David K. Bennion,
observed Mr. Miller, followed him out the door into the parking lot
and confronted him.

(R.82)

Upon not receiving a satisfactory

answer to his request to see a receipt, Mr. Bennion asked Mr. Miller
to accompany him back into the store.
refused.

(R. 84)

(R. 83). Mr. Miller

At this point, Mr. Bennion grabbed Mr. Miller by

the arm and began pulling him toward the door.

(R. 84). Mr. Miller

then put the beer and cigarettes on the ground and pulled a hunting
knife from a scabbard he was wearing on the outside of his belt.
(R. 84-85).

Mr. Miller told Mr. Bennion that he would not go into

the store, but that he would return the beer and cigarettes.
85).

The knife was out about 20 seconds.

(R.

(R. 93). Mr. Miller did

not make pay thrusting movements (R. 92) nor any verbal threats. (R.
92).

He merely refused to go with Mr. Bennion and returned the

knife to its scabbard when Mr. Bennion let go of him.

(R. 92). Mr.

Bennion then picked up the beer and cigarettes and returned them to
the store.

(R. 93). Mr. Miller thanked Mr. Bennion for letting him

go, and left the premises (R. 93). Upon his return to the store,
Mr. Bennion called the police.

(R. 87). Witnesses to the incident

noted Mr. Miller's automobile license number, turned it over to Mr.
Bennion who turned it over to the police.

(R. 86-87).

The police

arrested Mr. Miller at his home, that evening, (R. 107) took him
back to the store where Mr. Bennion identified him.

(R. 108). Mr.

Miller was then booked into county jail.
On December 6, Mr. Miller was charged, by the state with
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one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and one
count of retail theft while armed with a deadly weapon, a hunting
knife, a second degree felony.
85-1692.

The case r^umber assigned was

(See Addendum A ) .
On December 6, 1985, Mr. Miller was taken from the County

Jail in the Circuit Court in West Valley $nd arraigned on the simple
assault charge arising out of the fight wjLth Ralph Robinson on
November 9.

Pre-Trial Conference was setjfor January 7, 1986.

(R.

10).
On December 17, 1985, a preliminary hearing was held before
Judge Gibson in Fifth Circuit Court on the two felony charges
arising out of the shoplifting incident that occured on December 4,
1985.

Mr. Miller was bound over on thosej two changes for trial in

Third District Court.

(R. 2 ) .

On December 20, 1985, an information was filed against Mr.
Miller by West Valley City, charging one count of simple assault, a
misdemeanor.

The name of the victim was David K. Bennion, the

victim in the shoplifting incident that occured on December 4,
1985.

The police report referred to was 85-29842, the report filed

in the shoplifting incident.

However, th|e date of the incident was

listed as November 9, 1985, the date of the fight with Mr.
Robinson.

Also, the place the incident occurred was listed as 1476

West Parkway, the place the fight occureq with Mr. Robinson.
Pre-Trial was set for January 7, 1986.

(jsee Addendum B ) .

On January 3, 1986, Mr.Miller was arraigned before Judge
Judith Billings in Third District Court qn the two felony charges
arising out of the shoplifting incident.
guilty.

Mr. Miller pled not

Trial was set for February 13, 3J986.
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On January 7, 1986, Mr. Miller was taken from the County
Jail to a pre-trial conference before Judge Burton in West Valley
City.

(R. 10). The information upon which the proceedings were

held was the information charging simple assault against David K.
Bennion, police report 85-29842; in short, the shoplifting case.
(See Addendum B). Upon the advice of counsel, Mr. Miller pled
guilty in a plea bargain arrangement to the lesser included offense
of disorderly conduct.

(R. 11). Mr. Miller was sentenced to twenty

days and credited for time served.

(R. 11). Believing that the

shoplifting incident against David Bennion was resolved, Mr. Miller
moved to dismiss the two felony charges, arising out of the same
incident, pending in Third District Court.
On January 9, 1986, the Salt Lake County Prosecutor's
Office filed a second information against Mr. Miller arising out of
the shoplifting incident.

This information was filed for the

purpose of adding the charges of aggravated robbery in the
alternative to retail theft, and possession of a weapon by a
restricted person.

Case number assigned was CR86-500.

(See

Addendum C) (R. 18).
On January 31, 1986, a hearing on the defense motion to
dismiss the original charges brought against Mr. Miller as a result
of the shoplifting incident, case number 85-1692, was held before
Judge Billings.

Believing, as did Mr. Miller and, at the time, the

prosecutor, that the West Valley simple assault charge against David
Bennion, filed December 20, 1986, arose out of the same criminal
episode, she held that the aggravated assault felony was resolved by
Mr. Miller's plea of guilty to disorderly conduct.
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(See

Addendum D).

The State was thus barred fforn prosecuting Mr. Miller

on aggravated assault.
intact.

The retail theft charge wasf however, left

(See Addendum D ) .
On February 13, 1986, a preliminary hearing was held before

Judge Noel in Fifth Circuit Court on the second information.

Judge

Noel delayed bind over pending the resolution of a state motion to
reconsider the Order of Dismissal of the Aggravated Asssault
Charge.

(R. 131).
On February 21, 1986, the prosecution filed a motion to

reconsider the Order of Dismissal.
held on April 2, 1986.

(See Addendum E).

A hearing was

(R. 128). The prpsecution asserted that the

information filed in West Valley on December 20, charging simple
assault against David Bennion, on the basis of a police report on
the shoplifting incident, was in actuality, the simple assault
against Ralph Robinson which occured November 9.

(R. 135). Thus,

asserted the prosecution, Mr. Miller did not plead guilty to
disorderly conduct as to the shoplifting incident, but pled guilty
to the assault arising out of the fightirjg incident with Ralph
Robinson.

(R. 135-138).

The prosecutor (offered the possible

explanation that a clerk erred in entering the wrong name of the
victim.

(R. 139). However, no evidence, other than the assertion

of the prosecutor was introduced to show that the December 20 West
Valley information was intended to charge a crime arising out of
fight with Ralph Robinson, rather than a crime arising out of the
shoplifting incident with David Bennion.
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(R. 128-148).

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Billings reversed
her order to dismiss the aggravated assault charge.

(R 145). She

allowed the State to choose which information it would proceed
under, the original information filed December 6, CR- 86-1692, or
the second one with added charges filed January 7, CR- 86-500,
pending before Judge Noel in Fifth Circuit Court.

(R. 146). The

same chose to proceed with the second information and dismissed the
first.

(R. 148).
On April 3, 1986, Judge Noel bound Mr. Miller over for

trail in Third District Courton the second information.

(R. 2).

Mr. Miller was arraigned before Judge Billings on April 11, 1986.
(R. 21). Trial was held on May 5, 1986.

(R. 72). Mr. Miller was

convicted of retail theft while armed with a deadly weapon, a second
degree felony, aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third
degree felony.
1986.

(R. 27-30).

Mr. Miller was sentenced on May 30,

(R. 38-40).
The time from the arrest of Mr. Miller to his trial was

five months.

Mr. Miller was unable to obtain bail and was thus

incarcerated in the County Jail for the entire period.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Leonard Miller was arrested on December 4, 1986 and tried
on May 5, 1986.
county jail.

He was incarcerated for the entire period in the

The delay between arrest and trial, under the facts of

this case, constitutes a denial of Leonard Miller's right to a
speedy trial.

The delay was of sufficient length to trigger

analysis of the Barker v. Wingo standard adopted by this Court in
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State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538 (Utah, 1979 H

The delay was caused by

clerical error, by law enforcement authorities, and by an
unnecessary refiling of charges alleging £ new crime which the facts
of the incident clearly did not support.

Mr. Miller expressed his

concern and frustration with the delays at trial.

(R. 75-76).

In

addition, Appellant Miller was substantially prejudiced by the
unreasonable incarceration in the County Ljail for five months, not
only because of the inherent oppresivenessss of the lengthy pretrial
incarceration and the significant anxiety! it caused^ but because it
effectively added an additional five months to the amount of time he
otherwise would have served, under the Board of Pardons policy of
not allowing credit for time served priori to trial.
In considering the four factors of the Barker test,
I
appellant Miller contends that the circumstances, taken as a whole,
show that his right to speedy trial was Violated.
In addition, Mr. Miller contends that the trial court
violated his right against double jeopardy by reversing its order to
I
dismiss the aggravated assault charge. As shown by Mr. Miller in
his hearing on the motion to dismiss, he jhad already pled guilty to
a lesser offense of simple assault, charged by West Valley City on
an inforamtion listing the victime as Dayid K. Bennion.

(R. 9)

Mr.

Miller contends that West Valley City charged him with misdemeanor
assault arising out of the shoplifting incident.

He further

contends that his plea of guilty to the iesser included offense of
disorderly conduct barred the state from prosecuting on aggravated
assault.

The trial judge erred in merely accepting the assertion of
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the county prosecutor that the West Valley information intended to
charge assault arising from a totally separate incident, and that
the name of the victim and police report cited as basis were the
result of clerical error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DELAY OF FIVE MONTHS BETWEEN ARREST AND
TRIAL, CAUSED BE THE PROSECUTION, VIOLATED
MR. MILLER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
The Sixth Amendement to the U. S. Constitution provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . ."
The United States Supreme Court has declared this right
"fundamental" and therefore enforceable upon the States by operation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
213, 222-223 (1967).

Klopper v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.

Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution

provides a similar guarantee, supported by legislative enactment of
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-6(1)(f).
The right to a speedy trial is recognized as "one of the
most basic . . . preserved by our constitution."

Klopper, at 226.

The function of this fundamental right is "to protect those accused
of a crime against any possible delay, caused by either willful
oppression, or the neglect of the state or its officers."
v. Wilson, 383 P.2d 452, 458 (1963).

People

In Utah, "the speedy trial

right reserved under the Utah Constitution is no greater or lesser
than its federal counterpart."

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,

1378, (Utah, 1986).

- 8 -

The United States Supreme Court jLn Baker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514 (1972) articulated a four prong balancing test to determine if a
defendant has been denied a speedy trial.

Length of delay, the

reason for delay, defendant's assertion or the right to a speedy
trial, and prejudice to the defendant are all factors to be
considered.

However, no factor is to be qonsidered as a necessary

or sufficient prerequisite to a claim.

The four are related factors

and must be considered together with such other circumstances that
may be relevant.

The Utah Supreme Court adopted this test in State

v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979).
The United States Supreme Court held that there is "no
constitutional basis for holding that thd speedy trial right can be
quantified into a specific number of day^ or months."
523.

Barker at

The length of delay that is necessary to trigger inquiry into

the other factors is a matter for the states to determine and that
"because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length
of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent
upon the peculiar circumstances of the c^se."
I

Barker at 530-531.

In gauging whether the delay is excessive, the Court in Barker
indicated that the complexity of the change is a primary factor.
Ordinary street crimes will necessarily tolerate less delay than a
I
complex conspiracy charge.

Barker at 53f.

Other guidance as to when delay becomes presumptively
prejudicial and thus subject to the Barker analysis is given by the
Utah Legislature and this Court.

Perhaps most persuasive, and most

applicable under these facts, is the guarantee of Utah Code Ann.
77-l-6(h).

According to this statute, at\ accused who cannot make

bail is entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment.
- 9 -

This

30 day period has been held to be a statutory implementation of the
right to a speedy trial under the Utah Constitution.
Rasmussen, 418 P.2d 134, (Utah, 1966).

State v.

While this 30 day period is

not mandatory, it is directory, and should be given substantial
weight by this Court.

State v. Lozano, 462 P.2d 710 (Utah 1979).

In the instant case, Mr. Miller was unable to post bail.

His

arraignment on the first information was held before Judge Billings
on January 3, 1986.

(R. 137). Yet, because of delays caused by the

prosecution, trial was not held until May 5, 1986. (R. 72).
Appellant Miller thus contends that Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-6(g)
should weigh heavily in determining whether his right to a speedy
trial was violated.
Further guidance is given by Utah Code Ann. Section
77-29-1.

According to that statute, a trial must be brought within

120 days after a demand for disposition of detainers is filed by a
prisoner.

This Court has held that the 120 day period represents a

legislative expression of the time limits that constitute a speedy
public trial, under these circumstances, under the Utah
Constitution.

State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1985).

Miller's delay was substantially longer.

Mr.

In addition, this Court

has previously employed a Barker analysis triggered by a delay of
three and a half months between arrest and trial.
656 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1982).

State v. Knill,

Appellant contents that a delay of five

months between arrest and trial for an ordinary street crime is
sufficient delay to trigger a Barker analysis.
According to Barker, the length of the delay is
analytically closely related to the reason for delay.
weights are assigned to varying reasons for the delay.
- 10 -

Differing
For example,

purposeful delay on the part of the greatest weight. However,
"negligence . . . should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless
should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than the
defendant."

Barker at 531.

In the instant case, the five mojith delay between arrest
and trial was caused entirely by the law Enforcement authorities.
First, the law enforcement authorities erred either by listing the
wrong date and place on the West Valley information, as contended by
the defendant, or by listing the wrong victim and police report as
contended by the prosecution.

(R. 139). | (See Addendum B ) . These

errors caused all the confusion which led! to the motion to dismiss,
the order to dismiss, the motion to reconsider the order to dismiss
and the reversal of the order to dismiss,j all of which unreasonably
delayed the trial.

At the motion to dismiss the aggravated assault

charge, all the parties, the Judge, the defendant and the
prosecution, proceeded upon the belief that the West Valley
Information was West Valley City's effort to prosecute a charge
arising out of the shoplifting incident.! (R. 115-126 ).

However,

the trial on the remaining retail theft Charge was delayed by the
prosecution's filing of a motion to reconsider based upon their
interpretation of the clerical errors.
In addition to delays caused byjthe negligence of the law
enforcement authorities, delay was also caused by the filing of a
second information after Mr. Miller had been arraigned, went througt
preliminary hearing and was bound over ti> Third District Court on
the first information.

The primary reason for filing the second
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information was to add the charge of aggravated robbery, (R. 125).
A charge wholly unsupported by the facts of the incident and found
so by the trial court.

(R. 27-30).

This required that another

preliminary hearing be held before Judge Noel in Fifth Circuit Court
on February 13, 1986, the date originally scheduled for trial on the
first information.

(R. 4)

Yet more delay was caused because Judge

Noel was forced to delay his decision to bind over for trial until
Judge Billings was able to rule on the prosecution's motion to
reconsider dismissal of the aggravated assault charge, (R. 131), a
motion necessitated by its own errors.
Judge Billings rendered her decision on April 2, (R. 145).
Judge Noel bound Miller over Eor trial on April 3.

(R. 2). Trial

was finally held on May 5, (R. 72) a full five months after Miller
was arrested and approximately three months after Miller's original
scheduled trial date.

All during this time Mr. Miller was

incarcerated in county jail, confused and frustrated by delays
caused by prosecutorial errors and insistence upon overcharging.
The next factor in the Barker analysis is the defendant's
assertion of his right to a speedy trial.

As held in Barker, " a

defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that
duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent
with due process.

Moreover, . . . Society has a particular interest

in bringing swift prosecutions, and society's representatives are
the ones who should protect that interest."

Barker at 527. The

Court reasoned that a doctrine which demands "that a defendant

- 12 -

waives any consideration of his right to ^ speedy trial for any
period to which he has not demanded a tri&l" is unconstitutional.
Id. at 526.
"Such an approach, by presuming Waiver of a
fundamental right from inacMon, is inconsistent
with this Court's pronouncements on waiver of
constitutional rights. The Court has defined
waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed.
1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 146 ALR 357 (1938).
Courts should "indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver," Aetfia Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 81 L. Ed. 1177, 1180,
57 S. Ct. 809 (1937), and they should "not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights." Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. public Utilities
Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307, 81 L. Ed. 1093, 1103,
57 S. Ct. 724 (1937)."
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 526, (1972).
For these reasons the Court rejected the notion that a
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial, forever waives his
right.

_Id. at 528.

Instead, "the better rule is that the

defendant's assertion or failure to assert his right to a speedy
trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the
deprivation of the right."

_Id. at 528.

However, the Court also

held that "the defendants assertion of his speedy trialright is
entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the
defendant is being deprived of that righti." j^3. at 531-532.
I
The Baker Court held that the nature of the speedy trial
right is such that it is impossible to pinpoint the precise time in
the process when the right must be asserted.

Jj3. at 527.

In the

instant case, counsel for Mr. Miller raided the issue of the delay
in his opening statement at trial.

(R. 75-76).

He voiced his

client's frustration with the avoidable delays attributable to the
- 13 -

prosecution, and brought to the Court's attention that his client
waited approximately six months in jail as a result of the
prosecutions actions. (R. 75-76)

Mr. Miller contends that these

comments clearly reflect his concern that his rights were violated
by the prosecution and that they serve as an effective assertion of
his right to a speedy trial for Barker analysis purposes.
The last step in the Barker analysis is to evaluate the
prejudice to the defendant.

Under Barker, "prejudice should be

assessed in light ofthe interests of defendants which the speedy
trial right was designed to protect.
three such interests:

i)

This Court has identified

to prevent oppressive pre-trial

incarceration; ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;
and iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired."

J^d. at 532.

Regarding the first of the above interests, Barker
expresses concern that the obvious societal disadvantages of
unreasonable pre-trial incarceration are even more serious for the
accused who cannot obtain his release.

Barker at 532. The

detrimental impact of such incarceration is felt by the individual
through the resulting loss of employment, disruption of family life,
the enforcement of idleness, and the curtailment of rehabilitation.
Id.

The anxiety and concern of the accused caused by the delay

between accusation and trial has long been recognized as central to
the reason for the existence of the speedy trial right, United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966), and virtuallly mandates the
conclusion that a defendant is always prejudiced by such delay.

- 14 -

In the instant case, the accused^ Mr.Miller, was
incarcerated for the entire period between arrest and trial.
75-76).

(R.

Mr. Miller contends that the five month pre-trial

incarceration under the cloud of confusion uncertainty and
frustration caused by the prosecution in this case, was oppressive
and caused him significant anxiety and concern.
Mr. Miller contends that he was klso

strongly prejudiced

because he will not be credited for this pre-trial incarceration
period in serving his sentence.

According to Policy No. A09/12 of

the Utah Board of Pardons, the Board will not grant credit for time
served by an offender, other then time served by an offender
commited to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to a guilty, but
mentally ill conviction, or incarceration while undergoing
diagnostic evaluations.

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS POLICY AND PROCEDURE

MANUAL, No. A09/12, June 2, 1986.

(Addendum F ) . Under this policy,

the prosecution has the power to enhance |a prisoners sentence by
unreasonably delaying the prisoners trial through negligence or by
design.

In the instant case, Mr. Miller1 s trial was unreasonably

delayed by the prosecution through negligence and recharging.

Mr.

Miller contends that he was especially prejudiced by this delay
because, under official Board of Pardons (policy, it is significantly
added to his term of incarceration.
Because the facts of this case nieet the four part Barker
analysis, Appellant Miller asks this Courjt to find that his
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, reverse the
convictions below, and dismiss the charges.

- 15 -

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT MILLERS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN REVERSING
ITS ORDER TO DISMISS THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CHARGE
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no person shall:

"be subject for the same offense to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."

The United States

Supreme Court has declared the right against double jeopardy to be
"fundamental" and thus incumbent upon the states by operation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Benton v. Maryland/ 395 U.S. 784 (1969).

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides a similar
guarantee, supported by legislative enactment of Utah Code Ann.
Section 77-1-6(2)(a) which states that "no person shall be put twice
in jeopardy for the same offense."
According to Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-402(3), a
defendant may not be convicted of an offense, if he has already been
convicted of a lesser included offense arising out of the same
criminal episode.

Mr. Miller was charged on December 20, with

simple assault upon David K. Bennion in West Valley City. (R. 9).
The basis for the charge was listed on the information as police
report 85-29842, a report which described a December 4 shoplifting
incident involving Mr. Miller and David Bennion.

(R. 9). However,

Mr. Miller was also charged with aggravated assault upon David
Bennion by the State.

The basis for the charge, listed in the

probably cause statement, was police report 85-29842, the same
police report used as the basis for the West Valley charge.

(R. 9)

This Court has held that simple assault is a lesser
included offense of aggravated assault.
208 (Utah 1968).

State V. Hunter, 437 P.2d

Mr. Miller pled guilty to disorderly conduct, a
- 16 -

lesser included offense of simple assault* on the West Valley
information. (R. 11). Believing, therefore, that the guilty plea on
the West Valley charge barred the State from prosecuting on the
aggravated assault charge, Mr. Miller moved to dismiss that charge.
The motion to dismiss was granted.

(See addendum D ) .

On April 2 f 1986, a hearing to reconsider the order for
dismissal was held.

(R. 128-148).

The ptosecution merely asserted,

without presenting evidence, that West Vajley in fact intended to
prosecute Mr. Miller for a simple assault against one Ralph
Robinson, arising out of a fighting incident that occured on
November 9, 1985.

(R. 128-148).

The prosecution asserted, with no

evidence, that West Valley had not intended to prosecute Mr. Miller
on an assault charge arising out of the shoplifting incident; that
the listing of David Bennion as the victim, and the listing of
shoplifting police report, as the basis of: the charge, was a
clerical error.

(R. 139).

The date listed on the West Valley

information was the date of the fight witp Ralph Robinson.
Addendum B) (R. 6-9).
place.

(See

The place listed was where the fight took

(See addendum B)(R. 6-9).

However, the Court did not

consider the more reasonable interpretatibn that the date and place
were a result of clerical error, rather t|han the name of the victim
and police report.

(R. 128-148).

Another factor apparently ignored by the trial court was
the date the West Valley information was issued.
Ralph Robinson occured on November 9, 1985.

The fight with

(R. 6-8).

Mr. Miller

was ordered to appear and answer the charjge on November 18, 1985.
He failed to appear.

A bench warrant wa^ issued
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for his arrest.

On December 6, 1985 he was taken before Judge

Burton and arraigned on simple assault charges against Ralph
Robinson.
10).

Pre-trial was setf at that time for January 7, 1986.

(R.

The only reasonable interpretation is that West Valley

intended to do exactly what the information says on its face:
charge simple assault as against David Bennion, arising out of the
shoplifting incident.
All of these factors combined to give Mr. Miller and his
counsel a reasonable bonafide belief that they had resolved at least
the assault charge against David Bennion.

Mr. Miller served his

sentence on that charge in the county jail.

(R. 11)

Yet, based

upon the mere assertion of the Salt Lake County Prosecutor that West
Valley had not intended to prosecute the shoplifting incident, the
trial court allowed the state to try Mr. Miller again for assault on
Mr. Bennion.

Mr. Miller was convicted and sentended to 0 to 5 years

on that charge. (R. 40). Mr. Miller contends that this is a clear
violation of his right against double jeopardy, guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

For this reason, Mr. Miller

asks that his conviction on the charge of aggravated assault be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
Appellant Miller contends that under the Barker analysis,
adopted by this Court, his right to a speedy trial was violated.
According to Barker, the only remedy available is dismissal of the
charges.

Barker at 522. Appellant therefore asks that this Court

find that his right to a speedy trial was violated, reverse the
lower Courts conviction and order that the charges be dismissed.

- 18 -

In addition, Mr. Miller contends that his right against
double jeopardy was violated by the trial courts reinstatement of
the aggravated assault charge against David Bennion, inasmuch as he
had already been convicted, and served his sentence on a West Valley
City prosecution of a lesser included chatge arising out of the same
criminal episode.

For this reason, Mr. Miller asks that the

conviction on the aggravated assault charge be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this

VZ^

day of February, 1987.

EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Appellant
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four copiep of the above Appellantfs
Brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this

/ C__ dax of

February, 1987.

EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Appellant
DELIVERED by

this

of February, 1987.
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ADDENDUM A

T.L. "TED" CANNON
(
Salt Lake County Att-arney
By: JEFFREY THORPE
Deputy County Attorney
, .
3839 South West Temple, Suite 1-A,;1 ",
w
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
" LAKE
ft'ftwilu
Telephone: (801) 264-2260

ton
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SJTATE OF UTAH
Sc reened by:
As signed to:

THE STATE OF UTAH

THORPE
.TO

Plaintiff,

BA^IL

-frsttrvrr^lD,^

INFORMATION
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER
LEONARD G. MILLER
DOB 9-30-52
-,

iifr

AKA

Criminal,No

5F^2871

Defendant(s).

The undersigned, Det. Paul Jacobsen, under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crime of:
COUNT I
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, at 1500 West 3500 South
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 4, 1985, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 103, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, LEONARD GEORGE MILLER AKA
LEONARD G. MILLER, a party to the offense, did make a threat to do
bodily injury to David K. Bennion, accompanied by an immediate show
of force or violence, and did use a deadly weapon or such means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury;
COUNT II
RETAIL THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 1500 West 3500 South, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 4, 1985, in
violation
of Title
76, Chapter 6, Section 602(1), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the I defendant, LEONOARD GEORGI
MILLER AKA LEONARD G. MILLER, a party to the offense, did take
possession of, conceal, carry away, transfer or cause to be carried
away or transferred, merchandise displayed, held, stored, or offeree
for sale in a retail mercantile establishment, to-wit: Food-4-Less,
such merchandise consisting of one case of beer and one carton of
cigarettes, and that said defendant didj so with the intention of
retaining such merchandise or with the irttent to permanently deprive
said merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise,
without paying the retail value of such! merchandise, to-wit: undei
$100.00, and that said defendant was ar$ied with a deadly weapon a
the time of the theft, to-wit: a hunting Jcnife;
Continued to Page! 2.

"'*iV

8 OFS < 28'71

FORMATION
* a t e v . LEONARD MILLER
r
Page 2 .

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: Based upon West Valley Police Department
Report Case No. 85-029842, which details that the defendant, Leonard
George Miller, at the above date and location, took possession of
one case Budweiser Beer and one carton Marlborough cigarettes from
the display area of a Food-4-Less Store and left the store with this
merchandise without paying the retail value of such merchandise.
When the defendant was stopped by a store clerk, David K. Bennion,
and was questioned as to why he did not pay for said merchandise,
the defendant pulled a deadly weapon from his belt, to-wit: a black
handled hunting-type knife, and used the knife in a threatening
manner against the store clerk which allowed him to make an escape
from the store premises. The defendant was apprehended and returned
to the store by police officers later that night at which time he
was identified by the store clerk as the person who had committed
the above offenses.
THIS INFORMATION
WITNESSES:

IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM

THE

FOLLOWING

Officer Simpson
Officer Fluckinger
Det. Paul Jacobsen
David K. Bennion
Food-4-Less c/o David Bennion
Ted Elder

Subscribed "antl^^c^n to before me
this / # 4%?"**£;;Pfeg^mber, 1985.

Authorized for presentment and filing
T.L. "TED" CANNON, County Attorney

y^fyuyiir\ttoTT\£)

ADDENDUM B

r
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, 8TATB OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUKTY
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

y

WEST VALLEY CITY,
A Municipal Corporation,

fcC&

&H

F1LE D

IN CLERK'S OFHCE
Salt Lake Coun|y, Utan

Vr

Plaintiff,

INFGBmTIGN

VS.
Clerk

mOB:<
W&i $

J39/30/56
^H-ftw D e f e n d a n t . "

STATE OF UTAH

s.

$%,^

<~>->#;T^

)
) ss.
)

C o u n t y of S a l t Lake
De t e c t i v e

g

85 CRWV 5 5 3 5 '

MILLER, LEONARD G
1631 West 2700 S o u t h
W e s t V a l l e y C i t y , UT

Coxey, wveft V64

of W<pst Valley City, in the County of Salt

Lake, State of Utah on behalf of said City, on oath complains that the above-named
defendant whose other and true name is to complainant unknown, of West Valley City,
the County of Salt Lake and State of Utah, on

9 November

14 7 6 Wes t Parkway

I

1985

, at

, West Valley City, in the Coun

of Salt Lake and State aforesaid, unlawfully did dommit the public offense of VIOLATING A CITY ORDINANCE, as follows, to-wit:
Count 1 - D e f e n d a n t used
unlawful

. V'V:;
-•^f'H.V.

force

and v i o l e n c e

towards David

K.

Rennion.

?

*-'•

;

'* •

•

••»

•

contrary to the provisions of Section(s)

Count

e

1 - 1 3 - 5 - 1 02 ; ASSAULT

of Revised Ordinances of West Valley City, in suc^h cases made and provided*

Complainant
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ^
P_R£JRIAL

1/7/86

KS

10:00

dayQf

C i r c u i t Court

December
Judge

ADDENDUM C

T.L. "TED" CANNON
County Attorney
I9S6 JAN
By: DAVID S. WALSH
Deputy County Attorney.
Courtside Office Building^
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ^TATE OF UTAH ,.
THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

)

v.

o>

LEONARD GEORGE MILLER
DOB 09/30/52,

Screened by:
Assigned to:
BAIL

Summons
mons

)

INFORMATI
)

D S Walsh
D S Walsh

<J86FS

5ca?

riminal No.
)

Defendant(s).
)

The undersigned
Jacobson
- WV^D under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 1500 West 3500 South,
4,,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December
u^s-vm*,*,. 1985, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER, a party to the offense, unlawfully
and intentionally took personal property in the possession
of another from the person or immediate presence of another,
against his will, by the use of i knife or a facsimile of
knife;
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
RETAIL THEFT, a Second Degree Felony* at 1500 West 3500 South, ir
Salt Lake County, State of Utahj, on or about December 4,
1985, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 602(1),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amenjded, in that the defendant,
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER, a party | to the offense, did take
possession of, conceal, carry away, transfer or cause to bt
carried away or transferred, merchandise displayed, held,
stored, or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establish(Continued on page Two)
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ment, to-wit: Food-4-Less, such merchandise consisting of
beer and cigarettes, and that said defendant did so with the
intention of retaining such merchandise or with the intent
to permanently deprive said merchant of the possession, use
or benefit of such merchandise, without paying the retail
value of such merchandise, and defendant k&$—fcwiec—be-en
<5?
c<Mwiited of HAefX; CAJJI^O^^I
V. ^fr**m
jUJ*^-^^—,
COUNT II
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, at 1500 West 3500 South,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 4,
1985, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 103, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER, a party to the offense, assaulted
David K, Bennion, by threatening to do bodily injury to
David K. Bennion accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence, by the use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife;
COUNT III
POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Third Degree
Felony, at 1500 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on or about December 4, 1985, in violation of Title
76, Chapter 10, Section 503, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, LEONARD GEORGE MILLER, a
party to the offense, did have in his possession a dangerous
weapon, to-wit: a knife, while on parole for a felony;
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Simpson
Fluckinger
Kevin Kenna

Paul Jacobsen

David K Bennion

Ted Elder

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Based upon West Valley Police Department report case 85-29842 which
details that the defendant, Leonard George Miller, on or about
December 4, 1985 at approximately 1720 at 1500 West 3500 South, West
Valley City, took possession of 1 case Budwiser beer and 1 carton
Marlborough cigarettes from the display area of Food-4-Less store
and left the store with this merchandise without paying the retail
value of such merchandise. When the defendant was stopped by a
store clerk, David K« Bennion, and was questioned as to why he did
not pay for said merchandise, the defendant pulled a deadly weapon
from his belt, to-wit: a black handled hunting-type knife, and used
(Continued on page Three)
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the knife in a threatening manner against the store clerk which
allowed him to make an escape from the store premises.
The
defendant was apprehended and returned to the store by police
officers later that night at which time he was identified by the
store clerk as the person who had committed the above offenses.

ADDENDUM D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

CR-85-1692

vs.
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss cftme before the Court on
January 31, 1986.

The defendant was represented by James Valdez,

Esq. , and the State was represented by Dave Walsh, Esq.

The

Court took the matter under advisement, to review the legal
authorities submitted,

and is prepatfed to enter its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law as incorporated in this Memorandum
Decision.
FACTS
This matter arises out of a single criminal episode occurring
on December 4, 198 5 in West Valley City, Utah.

The defendant

was charged with assault, a misdemeanor, in the West Valley
Circuit Court.

According to the statements of counsel for the

defendant, and uncontroverted by the State, the defendant, as
a result of plea negotiations, pled guilty to disorderly conduct
as a lesser included offense of assault.

The defendant was

subsequently charged as a result of the same criminal episode

STATE V, MILLER
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

in the Third District Court with aggravated assault and retail
theft, both charges being felonies. Defendant brings this Motion,
arguing that the aggravated assault charge in the District Court
should be dismissed in view of the fact that the defendant has
pled guilty to a lesser included offense thereof.
OPINION
I.

Lesser Included Offense

Utah Code Ann., Section 76-1-402(3), states:
A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charge but may not
be convicted of both the offense charged
and the included offense. An offense is
so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all of the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged. . . .
The above statutory provision clearly states that a defendant
may not be convicted of an offense if he has already been convicted
of a lesser included offense arising out of the same criminal
episode.
In Farrow v. Smith, 541 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1975), the Utah
Supreme Court explained when an offense is a lesser included
offense of a greater charge.
The rule as to when one offense is included
in another is that the greater includes
a lesser one when establishment of the greater
would necessarily include proof of all of
the elements necessary to prove the lesser.

STATE V. MILLER
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Conversely, it is only when the proof of
the lesser offense requires some element
not involved in the greater offense that
the lesser would not be an included offense.
Id, at 29 (quoting State v. Brennan. 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d
27 (1962)).
The defendant was charged in Circiiit Court with assault,
a misdemeanor.

After plea negotiation$, the defendant agreed

to plead guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct as a lesser
included offense of the misdemeanor assault charge.

To allow

the State to now argue contrary to what they stipulated to in
the Circuit Court would frustrate the pie* agreement.
The question which must be answered, therefore, is whether
or not the defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of a
lesser included offense of the aggravated assault charge brought
in the District Court.

Utah Code Ann., Section 76-5-103 (1953)

sets forth the elements of aggravated assault, and states that:
"A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault"
and also engages in certain conduct in addition to that assault.
In view of the definition of a lesser included offense set forth
in the Farrow case quoted above, it appears clear that assault
is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault inasmuch
as the commission of aggravated assault necessarily includes
all of the elements of common assault.

The Utah Supreme Court,

in State v. Hunter, 20 Utah 2d 284, 437 P.2d 208 (1968), expressly
held that simple assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated
assault.

It follows, therefore, that the disorderly conduct

STATE V. MILLER
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charge, being a lesser included offense of simple assault, is
in turn a lesser included offense of aggravated assault.

The

defendant, therefore, pursuant to Section 76-1-402, Utah Code
Ann. , cannot be lawfully convicted of the greater aggravated
assault charge inasmuch as he has already been convicted of
a lesser included offense arising out of a single criminal episode.
II.

Retail Theft Charge

The defendant is also charged in this Court with a retail
theft charge, a second degree felony.

Although the oral arguments

of counsel were unclear, it appears necessary to address the
issue of whether or not this charge may be properly brought
in the District Court after the defendant was convicted in the
Circuit Court on the assault/disorderly conduct charge.

Utah

Code Ann., Section 76-1-402(2) states that:
Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode,
unless the court otherwise orders to promote
justice, a defendant shall not be subject
to separate trials for multiple offenses
whens
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction
of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned
on the first information or indictment.
At the time of oral argument on defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
counsel for the State brought the above provision to the attention
of the Court, and argued that it did not preclude, and offered
case law to the effect that it did not preclude additional proceed-

STATE V. MILLER
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ings on the retail theft charge in th^ District Court under
the circumstances of the present matter.

It is unclear whether

or not defense counsel was making such bbjection, but inasmuch
as counsel for the State felt it necessary to handle such issue,
the Court will also briefly address that issue.
At first blush, Section 76-1-402(2) suggests that all of
the charges against the defendant arising out of the single
criminal episode must be brought in a tingle trial.

Although

the District Court had jurisdiction of all of the offenses charged
here, the defendant had the right to keep the misdemeanor assault
charge in the Circuit Court, and the District Court was powerless
to take the matter from the Circuit Cou^rt.
P. 2d 342, 344 (Utah 1979).

State v. Sosa, 598

Furthermore, the Circuit Court did

not have any jurisdiction over the felony retail theft charge,
and therefore could not dispose of that matter.

The Utah Supreme

Court has held that Section 76-1-402(2) d0es not require a single
trial where the separate charges could nojt be brought or handled
in a single court, as is the case here.
P.2d 342, 344 (Utah 1979).

State v. Sosa, 598

Defendant chose to plead to the

misdemeanor assault charge in the Circuit Court, as it was his
right to, and thereby precluded the District Court from handling
the matter.

On the other hand, the felony theft charge brought

in the District Court could not have been handled in the Circuit
Court.

To interpret Section 76-1-402 so a$ to allow the defendant

STATE V. MILLER
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to force the disposition of a misdemeanor in the Circuit Court
and thereby escape prosecution for a felony arising out of a
single criminal episode would be a complete frustration of justice.
The felony retail theft charge against the defendant, therefore,
may be properly brought in the District Court.
CONCLUSION
The defendant cannot be tried for the aggravated assault
charge in the District Court inasmuch as he has already been
convicted of a lesser included offense.

The defendant's Motion

to Dismiss as to the aggravated assault charge is, therefore,
granted.

The felony retail theft charge, however, is still

a viable charge and is properly brought in this District Court.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to the remaining felony retail
theft charge, therefore-is denied.
Dated this

0

day of February, 1986.

JUBITTH M. BILLINGS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

/

ADDENDUM E

T. L. "TED" CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney
D W I D S. WALSH
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UIAH

MOTION TO RECONSIDER
COURT ORDER.

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v

Criminal No. CR 85-1692

LEONARD GEORGE MILLER,

Honl Judith M. Billings

Defendant.

COMES now the State of Utah and moves this Court to reconsider its
Order dismissing portions of Case No CR 85-1692. This Motion is based upon the
grounds that the defendant misrepresented certain facts to this Court at the
time of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss.
represented that this case was pled
conduct.

Specifically, the defendant has

from a simple assault to a disorderly

In fact, there were two assault charges filed against the defendant.

The first charge, and one which was handled by Ithe West Valley City Attorney,
occurred on 9 November 1985 at 1476 West Parkway.

A second assault charge, the

one pending before this Court, was an aggravated assault which occurred on
Decenber 4, 1985, at 1500 West 3500 South in Wejst Valley City.
Defendant has represented that there was only one charge, when in
fact, there were two.

The City Attorney had ifio authority to bind the State

and in fact made no representation that he was binding the State. The defendant

MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT ORDER
CR 85-1682
Page 2
has attempted to mislead this Court and the State by revealing only half the
truth.
WHEREFORE, the State of Utah prays that this Court hold a hearing at
which these matters may be more fully explored and a fair and proper resolution
reached.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

<z?'

day of FEBRUARY, 1986.
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UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS
POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL

Date:

June 2, 1986

Page
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Number:

A09/12

Title:

Granting Credit for Time Served

Authority:

Utah Code Annotated 77-27-5
Utah Code Annotated 77-27-9(3)
Utah Code Annotated 76-3-404
Utah Code Annotated 77-35-21.5
Attorney General's Opinion Dated October 26, 1978

Purpose:

To establish the Board of Pardons * policy on granting credit for
time served prior to commitment to ttye prison.

Policy:

It is the policy of the Board of Paipdons to grant an offender
credit for time served prior to commitment to prison only as
required by state law.
j
Credit will be given for all time served by an offender
committed to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to a "guilty and
mentally ill" conviction. Credit v^ill also be given for up to
180 days served by an offender while undergoing diagnostic
evaluations.
No other time served while awaitinfe trial and sentencing or as a
condition of probation prior to commitment to prison will be
credited toward an individual's sentence.
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